Russia and Ukraine Tracker

May 3, 2026   |   by oemb1905

Version: 0.001
Release Date: Sat Apr 25 06:35:40 PM MDT 2026

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This is a working paper, meaning I update it slowly and periodically.

In this working paper, I argue that there is a false polarity that dominates the Western Discourse on the current Russia Ukraine conflict and its predecessor, the Ukrainian Civil War. Criticizing Ukraine’s constitutional violations, the treatment of its Russian and minority populations, and its glorification of the Third Reich, does not equate to supporting Russian imperialism or the war. Similarly, acknowledging Russia’s legitimate security concerns does not mean one endorses the Russian State, endorses military operations/invasions generally, nor does it imply that Russia has a clean record on humanitarian and/or geopolitical issues. Nevertheless, the majority of scholarly authors on this topic attempt to reduce it to a false binary. My aim is to cut through this tribal binary, examine the historical record with intellectual honesty, and avoiding simplistic narratives that harm potential resolution.

This working paper asks:

• What transpired since Ukraine’s founding and how have these events impacted geopolitical agreements that came prior/after?
• Who are the responsible parties, factions, or key players in this event and its surrounding geopolitical issues?
• How does the International Community assist in fixing this situation and who/what takes the lead in doing that?
• In seeking resolution, what conditions should assisting countries impose on Russia and Ukraine?

This working paper shall:

• Disclose all revisions, removals, and/or corrections at the bottom of the paper
• Cite the date the fact was confirmed and who found it (apex or other user)
• Update the version and release date with each change

Please be patient with me regarding supporting documents for the arguments and/or claims below as it will take some time to gather everything on this new site. I am currently in the process of building the Apex Cloud and once that’s complete, migration for this post’s supporting documents is estimated to take six months to a year.

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0. Soviet dissolution, Ukrainian nationhood, and pan-Ukrainian identity

• 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav: Cossack Hetmanate under Bohdan Khmelnytsky entered a military and political union with Muscovy (Tsardom of Russia). Conducted in Ruthenian (Cossack side) and Old Russian (Muscovite side) with interpreters.
• 1772–1795 Partitions of Poland: Most of Right-Bank Ukraine came under Russian Empire control.
• 1921 Treaty of Riga: Ended Polish-Soviet War; western Ukraine (Galicia, Volhynia) went to Poland, central and eastern Ukraine to Soviet Ukraine.
• 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Secret Protocols): Allowed Soviet annexation of western Ukraine from Poland.
• 1945 Yalta/Potsdam Agreements: Confirmed post-WWII borders, placing all of Ukraine within the Soviet Union.
• 1954 Crimea Transfer: Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR (an internal administrative act within the USSR).
• December 8, 1991 Belavezha Accords: Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus dissolved the Soviet Union. Signed by Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk, and Stanislav Shushkevich. Ukraine voted for independence in a referendum on December 1, 1991 (90.3% nationally, but only 56% in Crimea, 83% in Donetsk, 84% in Luhansk).
• 1994 Budapest Memorandum: Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security “assurances” (not guarantees) from Russia, the US, and UK.
• 1997 Russia-Ukraine Friendship Treaty: Recognized existing borders and pledged mutual respect for territorial integrity.
• 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter: Began formal cooperation between Ukraine and NATO.

How Ukraine Formed: The state was born in 1991 with broad consensus on self-efficacy in the referendum (Dec 1, 1991), but there were massive internal contradictions under the surface. A clear east-west cultural and linguistic divide existed from the start. Russian was the dominant home language across the east and south (60–90% in Donetsk, Luhansk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia urban areas). The 1991 independence referendum masked these divisions. Nuclear disarmament via Budapest was sold as a great success but left Ukraine without real security guarantees. The 1997 Friendship Treaty with Russia was quickly undermined by NATO outreach.

The Orange Revolution (2004–2005) as Precursor to Maidan The Orange Revolution was the first major post-Soviet attempt by Western-backed forces to pull Ukraine decisively westward. The November 21, 2004 run-off between Viktor Yanukovych (Party of Regions) and Viktor Yushchenko was riddled with fraud allegations by the OSCE. This resulted in thousands of Western Ukrainians protesting in Maidan Square. The Supreme Court annulled the results, and the December 26 re-vote gave Yushchenko victory (51.99% vs 44.20%). Despite the allegations of fraud, the final race was relatively close. Furthermore, Yanukovych would return and win comfortably 6 years later, which shows that despite the fraud allegations, he had significant popular support from 2004-2014. In the Orange Revolution, Western governments (US, EU) and NGOs heavily supported the protests as follows:

• United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and National Endowment for Democracy (NED): Together, these organizations spent upwards of $65 million on “democracy assistance” in the two years leading up to the 2004 election. These activities included but were not limited to training activists, funding exit polls, supporting “independent” media, and election monitoring.
• National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI): Each of these US government-funded organizations, which function as international and geopolitical proxies for the two-party giants in US politics, actively trained opposition activists and poll-watchers. This funding came primarily through USAID/NED.
• Freedom House: Another US government-funded organization which coordinated election monitors, trained Western-aligned civil groups in Ukraine, and assisted activists and protests. Freedom House has not disclosed how much it spent, but accepted estimates range from $5-10 million USD.
• US Embassy Pressure: Ambassador John Herbst publicly warned the Yanukovych government about fraud and election-rigging. No such warning was given to Yushenko because it was widely accepted that he served as a proxy for US, EU, and Western interests. Close analysis of the elections and run-offs, however, and Yanukovych’s subsequent legitimate victory in 2010, suggest that although fraud was indeed found/present, it was overstated and leveraged for revolutionary and government usurping purposes.
• International Renaissance Foundation: Overtly funded by George Soros’ Open Society Foundation, spent upwards of $2 million on organizing and paying protesters from 2003-2004.
• European Union (EU): The EU condemned the November run-off and sent diplomats to intervene. They pushed for an annulment and under Poland’s President Kwaśniewski’s lead, they succeeded in getting the Ukrainian Courts to act accordingly.

There are other examples besides those listed above. Moreover, the funding and influence was decidedly one-sided, often featuring support of the opposition, public censure of Yanukovych and the legitimate grassroots efforts and base of the Party of Regions. In the years after the final run-off, Yushchenko’s government quickly collapsed into infighting and corruption. Yanukovych returned and won the presidency fairly in 2010 in yet another close run-off against Yulia Tymoshenko (48.95% vs. 45.47%). Again, although the OSCE confirmed election fraud occurred in 2004, the close results and subsequent Yanukovych victory show that country was genuinely fractured. Overall, the Western/Northern states saw these events as indications of democratic breakthrough, liberation from years of Russian influence, etc., while the Eastern/Southern states viewed this as an overt US/EU-orchestrated power grab. Although the Orange Revolution did not result in regime change, it taught both the Ukrainian far-right and moderate liberal opposition groups that street power combined with Western diplomatic and financial support could override election results. The pan-Ukrainian identity, which had always included Russian-speaking and/or Russian-identifying Ukrainians (as well as Tatars, Poles, Hungarians, and other minorities in Ukraine proper), was starting to dissolve.

1. The Maidan Square Uprising and formation of new Government

The events of late 2013 and early 2014 in Kyiv are frequently romanticized as a spontaneous and grassroots uprising against corruption and for European integration. In truth, and just like the preceding Orange Revolution, the events were explicitly incited, paid for, and supported by US/EU interests. This is not to say that the Western/Northern Ukrainian interests were not legitimate sentiments or interests, quite the contrary. It is rather that, instead of inculcating these values across Ukraine through legitimate exercise of the democratic process, leadership cavorted with outside groups to fund and support protests in Western Ukraine. These protests ultimately turned violent and when the President temporarily fled for safety reasons, the opposition held an illegal Rada vote to depose the President and install a new government. This vote was conducted without any of the 122 Party of Regions members present. As such, the vote was 328-0, which was 10 votes shy of the Article 111 requirement in the Ukrainian Constitution. Despite this, Western/Northern Ukrainian leadership, along with US/EU proxy support, ratified the vote and installed a new government. Eastern and Russian academics largely refer to this as a US-EU-led coup. This is because there was significant US/EU influence for opposition groups. It is certainly fair to argue that Yanukovych’s policies, notably the suspension of the EU Association Agreement (Nov. 21), were a significant driver of tensions. These policies, however, supported Russian-speaking and/or Russian-identifying Ukrainians who, up until that time, shared in the greater pan-Ukrainian identity. This stance also eased legitimate Russian security interests, as the EU agreement was viewed as a step towards NATO and/or formal EU affiliation, perceived by the majority of Russian leadership as bringing hostile forces to Russia’s borders.

• United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and National Endowment for Democracy (NED): The U.S. provided substantial financial and organizational support through USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Between 2012 and 2014, these organizations spent tens of millions of dollars on Ukrainian NGOs, activist training, media outlets, and election-related projects. Victoria Nuland, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, publicly stated in December 2013 that the United States had invested over $5 billion in Ukraine’s “democracy building” since 1991.
• International Renaissance Foundation: The same Soros-backed foundation which doubled down on its earlier efforts, spending a whopping $200 million USD between 2005-2014 organizing and paying protesters, supporting opposition media, activist networks, established training programs for journalists, and provided election monitoring support (but only for opposition-aligned groups).
• National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI): These same US government-funded organizations, which continue to function as international and geopolitical proxies for the two-party giants in US politics, once again played a significant role in the Maidan Square protests. From 2004-2014, the NDI actively trained opposition parties and activists, ran leadership programs, and supported get-out-the-vote efforts for pro-Western candidates, and spent nearly $20 million. The IRI, on the other hand, spent $18 million on party-building for opposition groups, poll-watcher training, and youth mobilization programs. This funding came primarily through USAID/NED.
• Freedom House: The same US government-funded organization from above spent nearly $12 million in the period from 2004-2014 on election monitors, civic activism, “independent” media, and actively assisted in organizing large-scale protest logistics during Euromaidan.
• US Embassy Pressure: Victoria Nuland, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, publicly stated in December 2013 that the United States had invested over $5 billion in Ukraine’s “democracy building” since 1991. A leaked telephone call (Feb 14th, 2014) between Victoria Nuland and U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt revealed the U.S. was actively selecting Ukraine’s future government, with Nuland stating “Yats is the guy” (referring to Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who became Prime Minister weeks later). In the same call, Nuland dismissed EU mediation efforts with “Fuck the EU.”
• US Senatorial Pressure: US Senators John McCain and Chris Murphy actively exacerbated tensions and called for regime change when they visited Maidan Square on December 15, 2013, addressing protesters alongside Oleh Tyahnybok of the neo-Nazi Svoboda party. They pledged explicit current and future U.S. support for a “peaceful transition.” Senator McCain stated “We are here to support your just cause, the sovereign right of Ukraine to determine its own destiny freely and independently. And the destiny you seek lies in Europe.”
• European Union Pressure: Although the EU leadership provided the initial pressure on Yanukovych to sign the agreement, they did earnestly try to mediate in the initial stages of protests. Despite these initial efforts, however, the EU and multiple European leaders, notably Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, ultimately rubber-stamped the deposition and began directly supporting the opposition.
• Unconstitutional Rada Vote: The Verkhovna Rada, on February 22, 2014, voted 328–0 to remove Yanukovych, citing his abandonment of duties under Article 108 of the Constitution. The reason the vote was so small was because, not coincidentally, all 122 deputies from the Party of Regions, representing the Eastern/Southern states of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Crimea boycotted the vote. They did this deliberately in order to support their legitimate cause/faction, knowing full well that the Rada would be 10 votes shy of quorum (338 required under Article 111). Despite this clear and obvious Constitutional violation, the Western/Northern Ukrainian interests seized complete power. This seizure was, without a doubt, impossible without the US/EU interference and support. Indeed, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that Yanukovych had “lost all legitimacy” and that the Rada’s actions represented a “legitimate democratic process.”
• Repealing the 2012 Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law (February 23, 2014): One of the major actions that led to secession. This will be covered below in the section on language, music, cultural laws, etc.
• Maidan Shootings and Support: Western/Northern interests, along with their US/EU supporters, directly paid and/or supported right-wing groups. There has long been suspicion that the shootings were false flag operations conducted and/or arranged by Andriy Parubiy, co-founder of the neo-Nazi Social-Nationalist Party. Not surprisingly, shortly after the publication of Ivan Kachanovski’s The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine, Parubiy was assasinated. I don’t have strict evidence that these were connected, however, the coincidence and decades-long theories strongly suggest that narrative. Regardless, during and throughout the Maidan uprising, numerous oligarchs supported the new alliance between the far-right and moderate/liberals:
  • Ihor Kolomoisky: Approximately $20-40 million in USD donated to paramilitary organizations such as but not exlusive to Right Sector, Dnipro Battalions, and medical/infrastructure (OSW, WSJ, Reuters)
  • Petro Poroshenko: Unknown donations and unfettered access to opposition-aligned media (with corresponding laws and civic actions that confiscated Russian-aligned media and/or outlawed it); paid protesters directly (Kyiv Post).
  • Victor Pinchuk: Approximately $5-10 in donations to opposition groups, funding of late stages of Maidan and post-Maidan paramilitary activity, as well as general civic donations (OSW).
  • Serhiy Taruta: Approximately $5-10 in donations to logistics, Maidan paramilitary infrastructure (Multiple Ukrainian outlets).
  • Dmytro Firtash: (Still investigating claims)

The newly installed regime immediately prioritized Western integration over national unity, fracturing Ukraine along ethnic lines. The success of the deposition, usurpation of the government, and the revolution was ignited by US/EU interference for over a decade. The reason it succeeded, however, was due to the right-wing Ukrainians joining the alliance with the moderates/liberals. This alliance allowed the right-wing groups to obtain power/normalcy in exchange for looking the other way on conflicting social issues. This united the government and right-wing paramilitary organizations together against Russian-identifying and/or Eastern-aligned Ukrainians. Until this time, Ukrainian nationalist groups largely sided in the other direction. Under this alliance and in the immediate aftermath of forming the new government, the Rada voted to revoke the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law, which protected the Russian language as a “regional language.” This revocation (Feb 13, 2014) polarized the sides of the pan-Ukrainian identity and is widely recognized as the catalyst which sparked two states to secede from Ukraine Donetsk (April 7, 2014) and Luhansk (April 27, 2014). Many US/EU news organizations report on the Civil War being a Russian-led operation that lacked grassroots or local support. They often cite Donetsk’ locals use of and coordination/planning with Russian sympathizers, notably Igor Strelkov, as evidence of this being a non-Ukrainian uprising. Many current news organizations and Ukrainian nationalists still espouse the dominant paradigm, i.e., that this was not an internal matter or a Civil War, but solely Russian influence. Mainstream writers or news organizations that dare to challenge the narrative are deemed a ruzzian trolls or labeled condescendingly as vatniks. This narrative changing is also consistent with the Ukrainian government, which labeled the secessionists terrorists and formed a new Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) to combat the secessionists. Despite these claims and positions of the Ukrainian government, there is simply too much evidence of Russian-supporting counter protests from March 2014 to May 2014 to support the claim that secessions were primarily externally driven. Hundreds of Ukrainian-born yet Russian-identifying leaders from Eastern regions not only went on record in support of these secessions, but actively led forces and councils in the newly formed and unrecognized government(s). Events like the Odessa Massacre (May 2, 2014) and Mariupol Massacre (March 16, 2014) show that there was a deep division in society; although Russian-influence, support, and sympathizers were present, this was due to the conflicting identities of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians who sympathized with the East, not intervention from Russia-proper. Not surprisingly, in the period between 2014 to 2022, approximately 2.5 million Russian-speaking Ukrainians fled to Russia, while around 250 thousand fled to Poland. Since 2022, it is estimated that an additional 1.5 million Russian-speaking Ukrainians fled to Russia. Overall, Russia has absorbed approximately 3-4 million refugees since the Civil War broke out. In the next section, I will look more closely at how the new informal alliance between the far-right and moderate/liberal left drove new policies that attempted to wipe authentic Russian-based influences and history from the pan-Ukrainian identity.

2. Changes in law and pan-Ukrainian identity post-Maidan

Post-Maidan Ukraine enacted a series of laws systematically marginalizing Russian speakers (29.6% native Russian in 2001 census, 60-80% home use in east/south), conflating language with loyalty and erasing Russian-aligned Discourse under the guise of “de-communization.” These measures, directly affronting roughly 30-40% of the population, serve as pieces of evidence demonstrating that the Ukrainian government engaged in ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, this was/is done explicitly and exploited Western paranoia over Russia as a cover story to engage in Western/Northern Ukrainian hegemony over the State.

Language, Education, and Music Laws:

• Repealing the 2012 Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law (No. 5029-VI, February 23, 2014): The Verkhovna Rada voted to repeal the 2012 Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law, which had granted Russian regional status in areas with 10%+ speakers. This was done just one day after Yanukovych was removed and was condemned by the Venice Commission as discriminatory. The governmental usurpation and actions like this were the immediate causes of the secession in Donetsk (April 7, 2014) and Luhansk (April 27, 2014). It removed protected status for Russian in 13 oblasts.
• Veto of the Vote to Repeal (Decree No. 157, Mar 3, 2014): Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov vetoed the vote to repeal the 2012 Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law in an effort to reduce tensions in the East/South. However, the intent, i.e., ethnic cleansing and distillation of pan-Ukrainian identity, was now clear to the East/South. First, the West/North leadership bypassed the abstention of the vote on removing Yanukovych and then, one day later, they voted to take away the protected language status of the East/South leadership. These are not, in any fashion, coincidental or benign.
• On Education (No. 2145-VIII) April 25, 2017: This law on education, specifically Article 7, limiting minority languages (Russian, Tatar, Hungarian, Polish) in schools to primary level (grades 1-4) and prohibited them in grades 5 and higher. Shortly after its passing, UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Rights (2018) stated that it was “Discriminatory against Russian speakers.”
• On Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language (No. 2704-VIII, July 16, 2019: This law mandated Ukrainian in public life (administration, media, services), with fines up to 9,800 UAH ($300). According to HRW (2022), this “marginalizes Russian-speakers in the East/South.” On the surface level, such a law seems reasonable. After all, why wouldn’t a country want to pass a law protecting its own national language? The difficulty, however, is that pan-Ukrainian identity was defined both in ethnic/linguistic terms and also separately in regional/geographical ways. For the latter group, Russian-speakers, Russian-identifying Ukrainians, and Eastern-aligned Ukrainians, this was a direct attack on their culture, way of life, and every day language for instruction and society.
• October 19, 2022: Law banning Russian-language books, films, and music in public spaces (NSDC Decree No. 583/2022). UN Human Rights Committee (2023): “Cultural suppression of Russian heritage.”
• There are numerous additions in my files that need to be added here, both revocations, reinstatments, latter new laws, etc. Thanks for patience !! ***
• These policies, enforced by a “Language Ombudsman” (2021), have led to public shaming (Lviv incidents, 2023) and Tatar exemptions (Crimean Tatar language protected, 2019 Law), targeting Russian speakers in SVO oblasts (80-100% in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia urban areas, 2001 census). *** forthcoming

Decommunization and Heritage Erasure:

• April 9, 2015: Decommunization Laws (No. 2558-VIII et al.), banning communist symbols, renaming 52,000 streets, removing 2,500 Soviet monuments. Eastern oblasts (e.g., Donetsk 70% renamed) saw this as Russian identity erasure; Cossack dual heritage (Ottoman/Russian service) ignored.
• 2022–2025: 2,500 additional monuments removed (e.g., Lenin statues in Odesa, 2022). HRW (2022): “Selective historical memory risks deepening divisions.”
• 2022–2025: 11 pro-Russian parties banned (March 20, 2022, NSDC Decree; June 20, 2022, court rulings), including Opposition Platform—For Life (44 seats). Supreme Court upheld bans (September 15, 2022).
• Forthcoming
  • Property Confiscations / Seizures: media moguls, intellectuals, the new alliance and isolation of Ukrainian Jews/feminists (using Zelensky as a prop to dispel this)
  • Bans on music listening
  • New Ethnic Cleansing Based positions and roles, e.g, Language Ombudsman
  • forced mobilization
  • state of egcy / zelensky reneging on his promise to allow new elections; corresponding corruption
  • The two separate eradications of political parties that took place
  • Pushkinopad
  • Laws for decommunization as proxies to wipe out / erase pan-Ukrainian identity under the ruse of de-colonialism …
  • Migrating content for above placeholders ^^ *** thanks for patience !!

3. Neo-Nazi Continuity in State Structures

Ukraine’s post-coup regime integrated far-right elements, glorifying Nazi collaborators while suppressing Soviet heritage, fostering a neo-Nazi coalition that Western aid has enabled.

Far-Right Key Figures, Groups:

• Andriy Parubiy: Co-founder of the neo-Nazi Social-National Party (1991, Svoboda predecessor); Maidan “commandant” (2013-2014); First Deputy Speaker of Rada (2016–2019). Video from April 1, 2014, shows Parubiy near Dnipro Hotel as Right Sector men exit with rifle cases, claiming “musical instruments” (Pravda EN, August 30, 2025; Kachanovski, SSRN 2015).
• Azov Brigade: Founded May 5, 2014, by neo-Nazi Andriy Biletsky (Patriot of Ukraine founder); integrated into National Guard November 2014. Symbols: Wolfsangel (SS Das Reich), Black Sun (Himmler occult), Totenkopf (SS skull). 2023 Kyiv War Museum exhibit “Storms of Steel” compared Azov to Waffen-SS Galicia Division (New Global Politics, August 7, 2025; Le Monde, June 19, 2025).
• Nachtigall Brigade: Revived 2022 from 1941 Nazi collaborator unit (OUN-B, Bandera-led; massacred Poles/Jews). Bandera’s 1941 leaflets called for cleansing “Russians and kikes” (anti-Semitic term) (OUN-B archives, 1941; Kachanovski, SSRN 2023).
• Svoboda and Right Sector: Merged with moderates post-Maidan; Svoboda leader Tyahnybok addressed by McCain (December 15, 2013). Lviv streets/parks named after Bandera/OUN (pogroms, 1943-1944; 70,000 Poles killed).
• Azov Symbols: Wolfsangel (SS Das Reich), Black Sun (Himmler), Totenkopf (SS skull). 2023 Kyiv exhibit “Storms of Steel” reenacted UPA with Waffen-SS comparisons (New Global Politics, August 7, 2025; Le Monde, June 19, 2025).
• Nachtigall Revival: 2022 brigade named after 1941 Nazi unit (OUN-B collaborators; Kachanovski, SSRN 2023).
• Canadian Honors: Yaroslav Hunka (SS Galicia veteran) Parliament ovation (September 22, 2023; CBC).
• Glorification of SS units, restoration of veteran benefits for Nazi-aligned veterans
• Eradication of Partisan and/or Ukrainian monuments, parks, streets, and even graveyards under the auspices of decolonization / decommunization … again, proxies for altering pan-Ukrainian identity
• De Jure Bans w/ De Facto Tolerance: Marta Havryshko and others documentation
• Canada honored Nazi veteran Yaroslav Hunka (Parliament ovation, September 22, 2023).
• The list above is hardly complete (more forthcoming)
• Western aid ($175B since 2022) sustains this;
• Zelensky actually had the audacity to appear on the Grammys to deliver his propaganda

4. Minsk II, NATO, and the switch from Civil War to global conflict (2014 – 2022)

From the middle of 2014 forward, there were a series of peacekeeping efforts and interventions. The first of these was Minsk I, where *** (migrating notes, forthcoming).

Ukraine Violations (2015–2022):

• 2015: 4,000+ violations, heavy weapons in security zones (OSCE Daily Reports).
• February 2015: Ukrainian forces launched a major offensive around Debaltseve, using banned heavy weapons (152mm artillery and multiple rocket systems) before the final encirclement.
• 2016: Non-disengagement in Avdiivka/Debaltseve (OSCE Thematic Report, March 2016). Systematic non-withdrawal of heavy weapons from the security zone, particularly in the Avdiivka industrial zone and near Horlivka (OSCE Thematic Report, March 2016).
• 2017: Mortar fire in security zone (OSCE Spot Reports). Repeated mortar and heavy artillery fire from Ukrainian positions into separatist-held areas, especially around the Svitlodarsk bulge and Avdiivka (OSCE Spot Reports).
• 2018: UAV reconnaissance in restricted areas (OSCE Annual Report). Frequent use of combat drones (UAVs) for reconnaissance and targeting over the contact line, in violation of Minsk restrictions (OSCE Annual Report 2018).
• 2018–2019: Ukrainian forces repeatedly placed heavy weapons (tanks, artillery) closer than the agreed 15km withdrawal line (OSCE verification reports).
• 2020: Despite the July 2020 full ceasefire agreement, Ukrainian forces were responsible for thousands of violations, including small arms, mortar, and artillery fire (OSCE recorded over 50,000 total violations that year).
• 2021: Sharp increase in Ukrainian artillery and mortar usage, especially in Donetsk sector; OSCE recorded over 80,000 total violations, with a significant portion attributed to Ukrainian forces.
• January–February 2022: Ukrainian forces intensified shelling of separatist positions along the entire contact line in the weeks immediately before Russia’s invasion (OSCE daily reports showed daily explosions in Ukrainian-controlled areas firing toward DPR/LPR).

Amazingly, there are still a majority of Western-based media outlets that refer to Ukrainian bombing of the Donbas as a fabrication. Of those who concede it happened, the majority try to argue it was exclusively against proxy Russian-proper military activity instead of conceding that these were Russian-aligned Ukrainians engaged in overt Civil War over governmental usurpation and eradication of pan-Ukrainian identity. It was later conceded by Merkel (October 2022) and Hollande (December 2022) that Minsk II gave Ukraine “time to re-arm” (Politico, October 2022). Ukraine’s failure on special status for Donbas (ignored referendums and sentiments of the local people entirely) stalled peace (RUSI, December 2022).

Ukrainian Massacres:

• Odessa (May 2, 2014): 48 deaths (OSCE: mutual, Right Sector role; HRW 2014).
• Mariupol (January 24, 2015): 30 separatist deaths (OSCE: separatist attack, but Ukrainian response criticized).
• Donetsk (2014–2018): The totality of bombings during this period totaled roughly 30-50 thousand Russian-speaking Ukrainians. This was a collective and long-term massacre. Reports and events from this period and region are what finally began to crack at Western bias.

Secessionist and Later Russian-proper Violations (2015-2022):

• 2015: Separatist forces conducted over 4,000 ceasefire violations, including heavy artillery shelling of Ukrainian positions around Donetsk and Debaltseve (OSCE Daily Reports).
• January–February 2015: Massive separatist offensive on Debaltseve, resulting in the encirclement and eventual Ukrainian withdrawal. OSCE recorded systematic use of banned heavy weapons (Grad rockets, 152mm artillery).
• 2016: Repeated violations in the Avdiivka industrial zone, with separatist forces using mortars and heavy machine guns in the security zone (OSCE Thematic Report, March 2016).
• 2017: Over 300,000 total ceasefire violations recorded by OSCE, with the majority attributed to separatist/Russian-backed forces, including nightly mortar and artillery duels.
• July 2017: Separatist forces fired on OSCE monitors and used drones for targeting Ukrainian positions near Horlivka (OSCE Spot Reports).
• 2018: Systematic placement of heavy weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, especially around Donetsk city and the Svitlodarsk bulge (OSCE Annual Report 2018).
• 2018–2019: Repeated use of banned 122mm and 152mm artillery by DPR/LPR forces during flare-ups around Avdiivka and Yasynuvata.
• 2020: Despite a supposed full ceasefire agreement in July 2020, OSCE recorded over 50,000 violations by year-end, with the majority coming from separatist-held territories.
• 2021: Sharp increase in heavy weapons usage and drone strikes by Russian-backed forces, especially in the southern Donetsk and Luhansk sectors (OSCE reported over 80,000 violations).
• Early 2022 (Jan–Feb): Massive build-up and shelling by DPR/LPR forces along the entire contact line, with OSCE recording thousands of daily explosions — immediately preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Both sides of the Civil War broke armistices and agreements. (Migration pending).

5. From Civil War to the SVO:

• Narratives on the SVO: invasion, peacekeeping force, both?
• International perception and geopolitical alliances: the false conflation of Ukrainian and Israeli narratives, North Korean involvement, African recruitmeny by Russia, massive use of foreign mercenaries by Ukraine,
• American organizational expansion: Megan Mobbs, Republicans against Trump firm Ukraine-alignment, stifling of Tulsi Gabbard and others who understand the complexity and dual-responsibility and origins of this situation … use these pretexts to discuss one of the PRIMARY points in this section … how a nuclear P5 power requires different treatment geopolitically-speaking than a fractured emergent country … (great example here is the
• Social Media Coverage (Kyiv Post, Vatnik Soup, Lviv Journal, Jay in Kyiv vs. Mauryana Naumova, Patrick Lancaster, chay bowes, RWA Podcast, panchenko, etc.) … discussion should focus on the poor quality of both sides … the Western authors write with perceived moral authority, while the Eastern authors seem on the continual defensive. That is, while the Western creators re-state/post widely accepted positions, the East spends the majority of their time arguing why those positions are wrong instead of providing their own frameworks. The ones that do provide frameworks on the East are either hyper-academic and ultra-nationalist (Dugin) or useful idiots (Diana Panchenko).
• Military posters … Albina Fella vs. David Z (cringe vs. cringe) … brief discussion … but mainly use these two to pivot to the major “map debate” accounts prioritizing the top three on both sides
• Return to topic #0 above, armistices and agreements etc., and discuss the concept and disambiguation between Ukrainian borders in 1991 versus “historical Ukraine” per se. Distinctions between original Ukrainian identity (early country attempts were called Western Ukraine, etc.) and later pan-Ukrainian identity. Discuss how, in some ways, the reductionism of Western Ukranian identity, or rather its exclusion and narrow view of what constitutes Ukrainians and/or Ukrainian culture … is ironically consistent with a reduction in aritificially conflated boundaries from administrative and/or technical reasons (Crimea, Odessa, Donetsk, Luhansk, etc., as historically Russian areas in the Ukrain region). Distinguishing how early nationhood did a poor if possibly non-existent job at distinguishing Ukrainian identity that stems from region/food/location/culture (East and West) versus one that stems from ethnic identity and language (West) … reminder to include Azov fantasies and modern lore in military trainings that invoke runes/Germanic traditions …. again, the same reason Ukraine welcomed in Nazis in the far West is precisely because they argue that they originate from a purer Slavic ancestor and are not mingled with Mongolian blood like the Russians, etc.
• This is also a good time to discuss ancient history of the Kiev Rus’ and its mantle (600 – 1800), language development (ruthenian, belarusian, rusyn, russian), imperial titles, how Ukrainian nationalism has infected museum culture exhibits, ancestry/genealogical studies by academic historians (argued proto slavs were “Ukrainian” lol)
• Adoration of German culture and the forced imposition of Ukrainian language not just on ethnic Ukrainians per se, but on all mixed Ukrainians … the irony here given that Ukrainian means “borderlander,” which by definition, conveys a sense of mixed heritage … again, geographical and regional identity versus ethnic/linguistic
• Significant time dedicated to silent academic voices like Ivan K and Marta H

Conclusion … (migrating)

Recommendations for Resolution

• Restrict Funding: Halt $175B+ U.S./EU aid until Ukraine repeals language laws (2019, 2022 bans), bans Nazi symbols (Wolfsangel, Black Sun), and prosecutes Maidan snipers (Kachanovski evidence).
• Cede SVO Oblasts: At minimum, Ukraine should formally recognize Crimea as Russian and then cede all of Luhansk, and then agree upon current boundaries for Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. UN-monitored referendum under neutrality guarantee. Demanding withdrawal or failing to cede territory will ultimately only cause more harm for Ukrainians.
• De-Nazification: Declare Azov and its SS-based rune insignia illegal, enforce symbol bans, enforce Bandera monument removal and/or formal statements on Bandera’s mixed record, review the 52,000 streets renamed for potential restoration, repeal decommunization; international tribunal for Pirubiy/OUN crimes – post assassination this is no longer necessary, however, it might be wise to still hold a Rada-based new review of the matter in light of Ivan Kachanovski’s publication .
• Revoke Ethnic Cleansing Policies and Laws: Provide right to return for Russian refugees, restoration of land, property, and asset confiscation, revocation of all anti-language, anti-music, and so-called de-communization efforts, restoration of Partisan tributes, restoration of mixed Ukrainian authors, monuments, and symbology (Pushkin, liberator of Berlin, Soviet brigade burial sites)
• Peace Mechanism: Joint Belarussian/Polish border force, NATO no-membership pledge; UN peacekeeping in Donbas to end ethnic cleansing, commitment to not joining the EU and/or allowing Ukraine’s airspaces for NATO
• Conditional Support: Western aid contingent on de-Nazification (Azov symbol ban, Pirubiy prosecution (no longer possible)) and Donbas autonomy (cede SVO oblasts per missing MPs).
• Condition aid on Azov disbandment,

It’s easy to view these

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This post is a working paper, meaning it will receive periodic updates, additions, and revisions. Revisions, removals, and/or corrections, will be documented below.

• 04-25-26: Initial Post and framework released

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Jonathan Haack
Apex Policy Forum